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SUMMARY
Contact tracing of persons with meningococcal disease who have travelled on aeroplanes or other
multi-passenger transport is not consistent between countries. We searched the literature for
clusters of meningococcal disease linked by transient contact on the same plane, train, bus or
boat. We found reports of two clusters in children on the same school bus and one in passengers
on the same plane. Cases within each of these three clusters were due to strains that were
genetically indistinguishable. In the aeroplane cluster the only link between the two cases was
through a single travel episode. The onset of illness (2 and 5 days after the flight) is consistent
with infection from an unidentified carrier around the time of air travel. In contrast to the
established risk of transmission from a case of tuberculosis, it is likely that the risk from a case of
meningococcal disease to someone who is not identified as a close contact is exceedingly low. This
should be considered in making international recommendations for passenger contact tracing
after a case of meningococcal disease on a plane or other multi-passenger transport.
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INTRODUCTION
Guidelines for the public health management of
transient contacts of persons with meningococcal
disease on aeroplanes and other means of travel vary
widely across Europe [1]. Chemoprophylaxis is rec-
ommended for plane passengers who are seated ad-
jacent to, in the same row, the row in front or behind
such a person for periods between 4 and 10 h de-
pending on the country, and some countries do not
recommend that fellow travellers should routinely
receive chemoprophylactic treatment at all [2]. USA
guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) recommend that chemoprophy-
laxis be considered for passengers seated directly next
to an index case on an aircraft for at least 8 h [3].
The CDC guidelines are based on a World Health
Organisation (WHO) report on tuberculosis and air
travel [4]. This states that passengers should be offered
chemoprophylaxis if seated in the same row or two
rows ahead and behind a diagnosed case of tubercu-
losis for at least 8 h. This report was based on seven
investigations into transmission of tuberculosis on
aeroplanes, one of which documented transmission to
six fellow passengers with no risk factors seated in the
same section of a long flight [5].
As policies for contact tracing vary so widely be-
tween countries and do not appear to be evidence
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based, we conducted a literature search of meningo-
coccal disease in passengers travelling with an index
case.
METHODS
Databases searched were Medline (1950 to 1 August
2007) and EMBASE (1974 to 1 August 2007). Each
database was searched separately and duplicates re-
moved. Articles were identified which included both a
meningococcal disease key term and a travel key term
anywhere in the article content. The search strategy
was not restricted by language. A list of possible
MESH search terms for each database was identified
and searched in addition to ‘textwords’.
Search terms used were ‘Neisseria meningitidis ’,
‘meningitis-meningococcal ’, ‘meningococcal infec-
tion(s) ’, ‘meningococcosis ’, ‘meningococcal disease’,
‘ travel ’, ‘ transport ’, ‘ transportation’, ‘passenger ’,
‘ journey’, ‘aircraft ’, ‘aviation’, ‘aviation accidents ’,
‘flight ’, ‘flying’, ‘aircraft-accident’, ‘aircraft ’, ‘air
travel ’, ‘ship(s) ’, ‘cruise ’, ‘ocean liner ’, ‘boat ’, ‘ fer-
ry’, ‘ railroads ’, ‘railway’, ‘ locomotive’, ‘motor
vehicle(s) ’, ‘ traffic-and-transport ’, ‘automobile ’,
‘bus’, ‘coach’, ‘ traffic’, ‘ transportation-of-patients ’,
‘patient-transport’. For the complete search strategy,
see Appendix.
Titles and available abstracts were used to decide
which articles potentially met inclusion criteria. Full-
text articles were obtained when more information
was needed or if inclusion criteria were met. Articles
met inclusion criteria if they contained information
on cases of meningococcal disease that occurred in
conjunction with a flight or while using any other
multi-passenger transport. Articles citing cases of
meningococcal disease associated with more than
transient contact, i.e. travel companions or school
excursions, were excluded. Reference lists of full-text
articles obtained were searched for relevant articles.
Other case reports known to the authors were also
examined.
RESULTS
The search identified 541 references, of which 28 full-
text articles were obtained. Three papers included
evidence to suggest transmission of meningococci on
aeroplanes or buses, while four further articles de-
scribed single cases of meningococcal infection on
flights.
Three articles in the literature describe clusters of
meningococcal disease linked only by contact while
travelling (Table 1). Harrison et al. [6] document
five cases of serogroup C meningococcal disease in
children who travelled regularly on the same school
bus. No other links were found between the cases
and the authors concluded that transmission had oc-
curred on the school bus. Beard et al. [7] also describe
two serogroup B cases where the only evidence of
contact was on a crowded school bus each day. A
third article by O’Connor et al. [8] reports two cases
of serogroup B meningococcal disease with onset 2
and 5 days after travelling on the same international
flight from Los Angeles to Sydney. These two cases
were seated 12 rows apart ; one reported regular
walks around the aircraft, while the other was seated
in an aisle seat. Chemoprophylaxis was provided to
those seated adjacent to, in front of, and behind each
case, in accordance with Australian and USA guide-
lines.
The meningococcal strains from cases within each
of these three clusters were indistinguishable by geno-
typing. Harrison et al. [6] reported the use of electro-
phoretic isoenzyme testing which found all five cases
had a rare and identical isoenzyme pattern. Beard
et al. [7] reported that porA/porB genotyping yielded
identical sequences; none of the serogroup B isolates
that year in the same geographical area had an



















O’Connor et al. [8] 2 3 Aircraft 14.5 h PCR (CSF) B (n=2) Indistinguishable genotype
Beard et al. [7] 2 2 School bus — PCR (CSF) B (n=2) Indistinguishable genotype
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equivalent serotype/serosubtype. O’Connor et al. [8]
reported similar results, where standard method-
ologies of siaD/porA/porB sequencing and multi-locus
sequence typing found the same allelic profile for
both cases. Again, no isolates had the same subtype/
serosubtype that year in Australia.
Our literature search also generated four papers
that documented meningococcal disease in passengers
of long duration flights without known occurrence of
secondary cases. CDC [9] received 21 reports of air-
travel-associated meningococcal disease (defined as
a patient with invasive meningococcal disease within
14 days of travel on a flight of at least 8 h duration)
between February 1999 and May 2001, of whom five
were symptomatic during the flight and 16 developed
symptoms 1–10 days after the flight. No secondary
cases or links between these cases were described.
However, this was a passive surveillance system
and chemoprophylaxis may have been offered to
those seated adjacent to the identified cases as rec-
ommended by CDC [3]. In a report by Riley [10],
symptomatic meningococcal disease in a passenger on
an 11-h charter flight led to active contact tracing of
over 200 fellow passengers, an unspecified number
of whom received chemoprophylaxis. A case of sero-
group W135 meningococcal disease with sympto-
matic onset on a flight from Japan to Singapore was
described by Wilder-Smith & Goh [11] with no men-
tion of contact tracing. Another single case of symp-
tomatic meningococcal disease in a student on an
11–12 h flight was reported by Bar-Oz & Loughran
[12]. Close contacts including those on the student
tour group were recommended to receive chemo-
prophylaxis. No secondary cases were reported after
any of these cases.
Two additional reports not listed in Medline or
EMBASE of cases of meningococcal disease in air
travellers were known to the authors. A report from
Canada [13] describes well the difficulties of compre-
hensive contact tracing after a case on a flight from
India. No secondary cases were observed, but all
contacts seated up to two rows in front and behind
and four seats laterally were successfully contacted
and received rifampicin. A patient with symptomatic
meningococcal disease on a 3-h flight from Madrid to
Berlin is described in the German national epidemio-
logical bulletin [14]. Because the passenger was re-
ported to have been coughing and because there had
been free seating on the plane, all passengers were
notified and advised to contact their physician re-
garding possible chemoprophylaxis. No secondary
cases were reported (W. Hellenbrand, personal com-
munication).
DISCUSSION
Only three reports of clusters of meningococcal dis-
ease linked through contact on transport were ident-
ified. In two of these reports the link was through
regular travel on the same school bus. The cases in
each of these two clusters could therefore be con-
sidered as part of the same social network. The only
cluster in which the cases were linked through a single
travel episode was on a long-distance plane flight.
In addition, we found reports of 26 similar exposures
that did not result in known secondary cases,
although in some of these cases, antibiotic prophy-
laxis was provided to close contacts. Publication bias
would undoubtedly favour reports on exposures that
resulted in secondary cases rather than in exposures
that did not.
It is important to distinguish between the risk
of transmission from cases of tuberculosis and of
meningococcal disease. The CDC guidelines for con-
tact tracing in transient contacts of cases of mening-
ococcal disease are based on evidence of tuberculosis
transmission on aeroplanes in a small number of
follow-up studies [4]. The ‘8 h’ recommendation is
based on these studies of tuberculosis transmission.
No such evidence is available for transmission of
meningococci. Transmission of tuberculosis via aero-
sol occurs through the deposit of infective droplet
nuclei (<5 mm in diameter) in the lung from persons
with active pulmonary disease [15]. In contrast, Neis-
seria meningitidis is transmitted primarily through
larger respiratory droplets as its natural habitat is the
nasopharynx [16]. It is not known whether the dry
environment in aircrafts might facilitate the for-
mation of droplet nuclei or what effect it would have
on large droplet transmission. In both cases trans-
mission is primarily limited to persons having pro-
longed close contact. The pattern of air circulation in
aeroplanes from ceiling to floor with little air flow
from front to back, as well as the filtration of re-
circulated air with HEPA-type filters would make
proximity an even stronger prerequisite for droplet
transmission in aircraft [17, 18].
Following transmission of tuberculosis, most indi-
viduals remain asymptomatic. A small minority de-
velop active disease after a latent period of weeks to
years [4]. Transmission of meningococci in most cases
leads only to colonization. A wide range of estimates
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for the duration of carriage has been published,
ranging from a median of 4–20 months and a mean of
6–29 months [19–22]. The risk of disease given colon-
ization with serogroups B or C has been estimated to
range from y0.0004 to as high as 0.1 in infants [23],
with a higher risk after colonization with serogroup
C than serogroup B. However, as the spectrum of
meningococcal genotypes causing disease differs from
that found in colonization studies [24], this risk is
likely to be higher from carriers of a more virulent
clonal complex. Although close (household) contacts
of cases of invasive meningococcal disease have a
higher risk of disease [25], surveillance data have
shown that <3% of all cases are secondary cases,
implying that most transmission occurs from asymp-
tomatic carriers [26, 27]. This is consistent with the
observation that cases are only colonized for a very
short period before onset of disease [28] such that
they pose a similarly brief risk to others. In all of the
clusters reported here, the onset of disease in the cases
could be explained by a point-source exposure to an
asymptomatic carrier. All of these factors make the
assessment of risk of disease in aircraft passengers
exposed to a case of meningococcal disease exceed-
ingly difficult. In conclusion, we found no convincing
evidence of the transmission of meningococcal infec-
tion from a case arising from transient contact on
aeroplanes or other multi-passenger transport. How-
ever, due to the dispersal of passengers and the risk
from asymptomatic carriers, it is also feasible that
travel-related transmission might not be recognized.
Guidance for contact tracing on board aircraft and
other transport needs urgent review with the objective
of achieving consistency of approach through risk
assessment. The ECDC has embarked on this exercise
[29, 30]. The evidence presented in this review should
contribute to the development of internationally
agreed recommendations.
APPENDIX
Full search strategy and results
No. Database Search term Results
1 Medline 1950–2007 Neisseria-meningitidis.de. OR meningitis-meningococcal.de. OR
meningococcal-infections.de.
8310
2 Medline 1950–2007 travel.w..de. OR transportation.w..de. OR aircraft.w..de. OR aviation.w..de. OR
accidents-aviation.de. OR ships.w..de. OR motor-vehicles.de. OR railroads.w..de.
OR transportation-of-patients.de.
37 017
3 1 AND 2 85
4 Medline 1950–2007 meningococcal disease OR Neisseria-meningitidis OR meningococcal infection
OR meningococcosis
10 140
5 Medline 1950–2007 passenger OR journey OR travel OR aircraft OR aviation OR flight OR flying
OR aircraft accident OR aviation accident OR transport OR patient transport
OR transportation OR motor vehicle OR automobile OR bus OR coach OR train
OR cruise OR ocean liner OR ship OR boat OR ferry OR locomotive OR railway
OR railroad OR traffic
4 78 899
6 4 AND 5 296
7 EMBASE 1974–2007 Neisseria-meningitidis.de. OR meningococcosis.w..de. 8572
8 EMBASE 1974–2007 travel.w..de. OR patient-transport.de. OR aviation.w..de. OR flight.w..de.
OR flying.w..de. OR aircraft-accident.de. OR ship.w..de. OR motor-vehicle.de.
OR traffic-and-transport.de. OR railway.w..de.
23 180
9 7 AND 8 130
10 EMBASE 1974–2007 meningococcal disease OR Neisseria-meningitidis OR meningococcal infection
OR meningococcosis
9292
11 EMBASE 1974–2007 passenger OR journey OR travel OR aircraft OR aviation OR flight OR flying
OR aircraft accident OR aviation accident OR transport OR patient transport
OR transportation OR motor vehicle OR automobile OR bus OR coach OR train
OR cruise OR ocean liner OR ship OR boat OR ferry OR locomotive OR railway
OR railroad OR traffic
432 814
12 10 AND 11 387
13 Combined sets 3, 6, 9, 12 898
14 Dropped duplicates from 13 358
15 Unique records from 13 541
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